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Abstract 
 
 
Wilfrid Sellars and Willard Van Quine long disagreed over the nature of ontological commitment in 
scientific inquiry. Particularly, they disagreed over whether abstract entities such as numbers, sets, or 
classes should be admitted into scientific ontology. In Quine’s view, positing such platonic entities is 
necessary in order for scientific inquiry to progress and for scientific knowledge to increase. Sellars, on 
the other hand, sees such a view as a form of platonic realism and eschews it in favor of a more austere 
nominalism about the ontological status of abstracta. I summarize the reasons for each philosopher’s 
view, drawing on a dialogue between them regarding the ontological status of abstracta. I argue that 
Quine’s justifications for his pragmatically-based realism do little to evade Sellars’ charge that such a 
view commits one to an empirically unjustifiable platonistic ontology. In Sellars’ view, an adequate 
philosophy of science requires an adequate philosophy of mind, and this implies that we cannot locate 
unobservable platonic abstracta on an ontological continuum with the unobservable theoretical entities 
posited in scientific theories (e.g., neutrinos or positrons). Those who are committed to the ideals of 
scientific realism and methodological naturalism must grapple with the question Sellars posed to Quine: 
“if sets are basic objects, how does the mind get in touch with them?” 
 
 
 
 
1. Quine’s Pragmatism About the Existence of Abstracta 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s Sellars and Quine exchanged arguments (via 
correspondence and articles) on an array of topics related to behaviorism, meaning, and 
language. Of particular interest is a short dialogue regarding the ontological status of 
abstract sets.1   
 
In a letter to Quine, Sellars expresses his fundamental disagreement with Quine on the 
ontological status of abstracta in clear terms: 
                                                          
1 Although Sellars begins the dialogue by restricting his discussion of abstracta to sets, he later 
makes it clear that the also has in mind such things as numbers, objects, attributes, and even 
propositions. 
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I simply do not see how to fit platonic objects (classes and sets) into a 
naturalistic framework. Bluntly put: If sets are basic objects, how does the mind 
get in touch with them?  
 
Quine’s view on positing the existence of such abstracta is primarily motivated by a 
thoroughgoing pragmatism regarding the progress of science. Although he identified 
himself as a nominalist and famously advocated for a "desert landscape" approach to 
ontology, Quine was always clear that an ontological commitment to abstracta was 
necessary in order to meet the ordinary needs of scientific practice.2  In his view, we 
can effectively treat abstracta as a “useful myth” without becoming mired in the 
traditional philosophical problems associated with the existence of such entities in 
nature. The positing of such things as numbers and sets is not justified by philosophical 
argumentation, then, but rather in terms of the fruitfulness of science.3  As Quine saw it, 
knowledge consists of interlocking webs of theories, and “science is a continuum of 
common sense” (Quine, 52). In epistemic terms, the myths of abstracta are to be judged 
in the same way as other myths (i.e., “physical objects and gods”)—namely, in terms of 
their ability to help “predict future experience in the light of past experience” and, in so 
doing, “expedite our dealings with sense experiences” (52). 
 
Quine’s response to Sellars’ “bluntly put” question about how the mind gets in touch 
with abstract objects such as sets relies on these standard Quinean principles. He admits 
that he is ultimately driven to a realist position regarding sets because set theory can 
establish the continuity of the real numbers. In his (1980) view, “without this we do 
not, perhaps, have a mathematics adequate to the ordinary needs of natural science” 
(28). 
 
In response to the question of how the mind “gets in touch” with sets, Quine claims that 
our knowledge of unobservables relies on a web of theories that exist on a continuum 
with common sense experience. Turning the discussion back to Sellars, Quine’s (1980) 
reply is another question: 
  
“How does the mind get in touch with neutrinos?” What we have is a ponderous 
theory consisting of interlocking laws and concepts. It is in contact with sensory 
evidence only at its edge. The doctrines of elementary particles and spin occupy 
a remote part of this theoretical structure, and so do the doctrines of real 
                                                          
2 See Quine; “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” “On What There Is,” and “Reference” in 
Quintessence: Basic Readings from the Philosophy of W.V. Quine (cited in sources). 
3 Quine has other stated reasons for positing abstract objects (e.g., a desire to avoid modal 
operators in truth-functional statements), but they are not relevant for the exchange under 
discussion. 
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numbers and sets. Epistemologically, sets differ from neutrinos only in being 
somewhat less analogous to observable bodies. (28) 
 
2. Sellars’ Nominalist Naturalism About the Nonexistence of Abstracta 
 
The topic of abstract entities is a recurring theme throughout Sellars’ writings. In 
contrast to Quine’s fairly straightforward brand of pragmatism regarding the role of 
such entities in scientific ontology, Sellars discusses a host of philosophical issues that 
arise when it comes to explicating our supposedly ‘given’ knowledge of them. In his 
view, since there are no such “things” as universals in the world, the idea that platonic 
abstracta can serve as a foundation for an empirical science of nature is a myth. Sellars’ 
view is that we should analyze the meaning of statements that contain references to 
abstracta according to the role that those statements and abstract terms play in particular 
contexts. He deploys a series of theoretical devices (i.e., dot-quote notation, ‘Jumblese,’ 
distributive singular terms) to develop a nominalist theory of meaning that avoids 
universal terms in favor of names of particulars in particular contexts. While a 
summary of Sellars’ nominalism is beyond the scope of this essay, his relevant claims 
regarding the existence of abstracta are that 1) admitting them into our scientific 
ontology introduces a host of coherence and justification issues and that 2) a 
nonfoundationalist, nominalist approach to scientific knowledge can account for the use 
of abstract terms without ontologically committing to the existence of their referents. 
 
Sellars’ (1980) response to Quine’s claim that sets exist on an epistemic continuum 
with neutrinos is that such a “Duhemian ploy” is a “facile gambit” that misses a crucial 
distinction between these two types of unobservable entities. The distinction is that the 
theory-whole of science offers a “causal account of the specifics of the hook-up” 
between micro-physical particles and experience. However,  
 
[t]his is not the case with such terms as “number,” class,” “attribute,” and 
“proposition.” (24) 
 
Sellars (1980) then concludes with a remark that, in addition to highlighting his 
disagreement with Quine, sheds light on his own conceptual strategy when it comes to 
scientific naturalism: 
 
This fact introduces a radical discontinuity into Quine’s Continuum, one which 
has important consequences for the problem of abstract entities, for ontology, 
and, above all, for the philosophy of mind. (24) 
 
Given that abstract entities do not, in principle, have any causal connection to 
experience, Sellars (1975) takes seriously Kant’s question of how it is possible that 
knowledge of nature has a conceptual structure (285). The question is not only 
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philosophical but also empirical, and Sellars thinks that its answer lies in developing a 
more adequate philosophy of mind along nominalist lines. Embracing platonic realism, 
in his view, commits us to the so-called ‘Myth of the Given’ in which the world is 
presupposed to have a categorical structure that is imprinted on the mind as a seal is 
imprinted on wax. 
 
3. Nominalism or Realism? 
 
In Quine’s final contribution to the dialogue, he acknowledges the “important 
difference” between abstracta and the posits of physical theory—namely, that in 
principle, the former have no causal connection to sense experience. Here, he 
seems to acquiesce to Sellars’ position somewhat by stating that we should seek 
out connections between sentences that refer to abstracta and “sentences that are 
more sensitive to observational evidence.”  
 
However, Quine does not specify how the former types of sentences might be 
distinguished from the latter, although (as Sellars often pointed out) such a task 
is fraught with logical pitfalls. Although the point merits further discussion,  let 
us leave it aside for the moment and examine what Quine has in mind in terms of 
seeking out the (supposed) connections between sentence-types: 
 
An understanding of the development of scientific language in the 
individual and in society should help to illuminate those 
connections, and I have been at some pains to speculate along 
those lines. 
 
(It is unfortunate that Quine does not elaborate on this point, since it is difficult 
to see how it is relevant to the issue of ontological commitment to abstracta. 
Historical optimism about the fruitfulness of science is at best a peripheral 
consideration when considering the coherence criteria for scientific ontologies 
about things in the world). 
 
Quine concludes by noting the irony of finding himself arguing against 
nominalism in favor of realism, but reiterates that his pragmatic concerns about 
the progress of science prevent him from “fighting the good fight shoulder to 
shoulder with Sellars.” Although the discussion ended on this note, it is not 
difficult to see the fundamental differences in approach between the two 
philosophers when it comes to ontological commitment. 
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Conclusion 
 
Sellars (1965) once remarked that Quine was committed to the “notion of a 
presuppositionless mode of reference” that “involves no commitment to 
something’s being the case” (113) and characterized such an approach as merely 
another version of the so-called ‘Myth of the Given.’ In terms of the debate over 
nominalist and realist approaches to abstracta in scientific ontology, it seems that 
Quine’s articulation of “observational evidence” remains vague, and his 
pragmatic reasons for positing abstracta venture far from the specific 
observational contexts that are supposed to be the proper domain of scientific 
inquiry.  
 
Sellars, on the other hand, remained convinced that since abstracta are not in 
nature, an explanatory account of the referents of abstract terms should be 
developed via a nominalist approach to the philosophy of mind. How the mind 
understands abstracta is to be explained on the level of (the meaning of) 
statements, not a mythical conception of some given reality. This takes us to an 
analysis of the use of statements in particular contexts (i.e., functional role 
semantics), and it is this sort of strategy that Sellars thinks can help scientific 
knowledge move beyond platonic realism about abstracta.  
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